A row of protection relay panels in a bright substation control building

Built to pass your security review.

Adding a vendor to critical infrastructure is a security question first. Here is the full answer, in the order a reviewer asks.

Designed against

  • IEC 62443 zone-and-conduit
  • NERC CIP
  • IEEE 1613 substation hardening
  • IEC 61850-3 environmental
  • Ontario Cyber Security Standard
  • TLS 1.2+ in transit
  • AES-256 at rest
  • Role-based access
  • Full audit trail

Why it is safe to add.

No control writes

It does not write to a relay, a breaker, a drive or a setpoint. It has no way to.

No inbound path

The site edge opens the connection. Nothing listens, in either mode.

No agent on the asset

Nothing installed on the equipment being read, and nothing reconfigured.

Encrypted end to end

TLS 1.2+ in transit, AES-256 at rest, on AWS in the region you agree.

Scoped and logged

Access by role and by site, every action timestamped, nothing across tenants.

Exportable, never shared

Your data. Export all of it, any time.

Never training data

Your readings do not train our models, and nothing is resold to anyone.

The premise

Every new sensor is a new way in. Including ours.

A transformer that ran thirty years without a network port had no remote attack surface. Add a gateway and it has one. The value and the exposure come together, so the connection must be built with care.

A gloved hand holding a patch lead beside an open terminal block, not yet connected
A communications cabinet in a control building: industrial switches, a ruggedized firewall and dressed patch leads

Networked

Inside your existing access rules.

Where you grant access, we connect through your network under your rules. For regulated utilities that means inside your NERC CIP program, documented for your reviewer. The connection is outbound.

A weatherproof edge enclosure with a cellular antenna on a pole at a remote site

Isolated

Or touching none of your network.

Where you grant none, a pre-configured edge kit reads at the panel and sends over LTE. It never touches your OT network. We supply the hardware, connectivity and configuration.

control authority
0
writes
enforced in the architecture, not in a policy
inbound rules
0
required into the OT network, in either mode
designed against
62443
the IEC zone-and-conduit model
every connection
TLS 1.2+
encrypted, in both deployment modes

The network layer

It works with the network security you have.

42Hz works behind your existing firewalls and segmentation, whatever the vendor. Where a site has none, we can specify and supply it through our partners.

Frameworks

It supports compliance. It does not grant it.

No product makes you compliant. 42Hz gives these frameworks what they ask for: visibility into critical assets, read-only, with a timestamped record of what happened. Your cyber budget and your monitoring gap can be one line item.

An operations room with every site on the wall
The path

What crosses the boundary.

Every hop between the asset and the person who gets called, in order.

A single armoured lead leaving a substation cabinet through a gland plate into a cable duct
At the panel
The reading unit polls what the station already exposes: relay registers, RTU points, meter reads, transformer gauges, inverter APIs.
At the edge
Values are timestamped and buffered locally before they go anywhere.
Across the boundary
The edge opens an outbound TLS 1.2+ session. Nothing listens at the site, so there is no port to scan and no inbound rule to write.
In the platform
Each value lands against the asset it came from, and the unit's own baseline updates.
Back to a person
A case reaches a screen, a phone call or an export. Nothing goes back to the asset.